What explains the Bangladesh crisis?

The precise sequence of events leading to Sheikh Hasina's resignation as prime minister of Bangladesh and departure for India on August 5 may not be available, but it appears to have followed the reluctance of the army to try and forcibly interdict the oncoming mass of people, as may have been the wish of the prime minister.

This left no option for her but to relinquish office and, as insisted upon by family, seek safety outside Bangladesh. In Nepal, too, in April 2006, the Royal Nepal Army refused to fire on fellow citizens, leading to the political retreat and eventual abdication of the king.

Several factors coalesced in reaching the outcome on August 5. The previous three national elections, in 2024, 2018, and 2014, with virtually no Opposition participation and charges of manipulation, resulted in massive victories for the Awami League. While the government could rightly claim that this year's election was held under existing rules, the absence of any Opposition left many people questioning its legitimacy.

The economic performance of the government was commendable, and Bangladesh was poised to become a middle-income country by 2026, its per capita GDP already exceeding India's. But the government was seen to be restrictive towards press freedom and the West, in particular, raised questions of human rights violations, notably against the Rapid Action Battalion. There were charges of widespread corruption. For some time now, observers felt that the government had distanced itself from the people.

In 2009, Hasina inherited from the predecessor civilian government, where the Jamaat was a partner, a record of benign indifference to Islamic fundamentalism. To her credit, she was successful in largely controlling activities of hardcore Islamists, while holding out an olive branch to moderate elements. This could not have been done with kid gloves and would have contributed to charges of human rights infractions.

Ironically, the current agitation started in June, after the High Court reinstated a quota system abolished by the government in 2018. The issue was subjudice. The primary issue at stake was the 30% quota for the progeny of freedom fighters. In its eventual judgement, the court reduced this to 5%.

The main issue and its obvious attenuation, if not resolution, by the judgment by the third week of July was lost sight of in the miasma that emerged following some unfortunate remarks from the government. Sheikh Hasina's implied association of the protestors to the progeny of Razakars, a much-reviled term applied to Bengali collaborators of Pakistanis in 1971, infuriated the protestors, who considered themselves citizens of Bangladesh struggling for a just cause. A government minister's threat to unleash the armed cadres of the Awami League on the protestors was counterproductive. More than four hundred, mostly young, people have been killed so far in the violence that enveloped Bangladesh.

The Dhaka Tribune sums up this episode:",…. this was a slow-motion tragedy, and there were many points at which the crisis could have been de-escalated or resolved. Sadly, this didn't happen, and the situation just grew worse and worse, as the death toll mounted and instability grew, and with it the anger and unhappiness of the populace, until there was no way back."

Since Hasina left Bangladesh, there has been widespread violence in large parts of the country. Primary targets have been members of the Awami League and the Hindu minority. Student leaders and even the emir of the Jamaat-e-Islami have issued appeals for the protection of minorities, and the ambassadors of the EU have drawn urgent attention of the government to the attacks taking place. Students have been reported to be guarding temples in Dhaka. It is not clear who the perpetrators are. Following the 2001 elections, violence against Hindus was orchestrated by Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat cadres.

We seem to be faced with an evolving scenario whose parameters still remain unclear. Judging by various statements of the student coordinators, they want a fundamental change in governance where there would be 'true' democracy, full freedom of expression, and autocracy would have no possibility of emerging again. How far the aspirations of the students can materialise remains to be seen. Certainly, none of the existing political parties measure up to their standards. But the youth in Bangladesh have paid a heavy price in blood, which needs to be respected.

It is natural that we tend to see developments in Bangladesh in terms of the areas where it affects or concerns India. But it is necessary to exercise caution in arriving at Indo-centric conclusions without empirical evidence. It is, for instance, a given that foreign countries, including those inimical to us, will fish in troubled waters. But it may be imprudent to conclude that they are behind the recent students' movement. We need to understand the true motivations so as to better be able to prepare for what may follow.

The last decade has been described as a golden chapter in Indo-Bangladesh relations. This will now require to be re-booted. The acting president of the BNP, Tareque Rehman, in exile in London has in a message to his countrymen applauded them, inter alia, for deliverance from a party that was 'subservient'. No marks for guessing what he had in mind or what path his party would follow if, as likely, it comes to power.

The appointment of Professor Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel-winning economist who pioneered micro-credit in Bangladesh, as head of the caretaker government is welcome. India would need to exercise patience and await developments.

(Deb Mukharji is former Indian ambassador to Bangladesh. The views expressed are personal)