‘India’s long-term strategic interests will eventually compel it to engage constructively with Bangladesh’

In the aftermath of the July uprising, there have been significant changes in Bangladesh's geo-political situation. Tensions have been on the rise with neighbouring India, with them providing safe haven to ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. 

On the other hand, with Dr Yunus at the helm, there seems to have been a reinvigoration of ties with the US and its allies. What do these shifts mean for Bangladesh going forward? 

The Business Standard caught up with Anu Anwar, a non-resident associate at Harvard University and a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, to get a better picture.

How do you view what seems to be a reinvigorated US engagement with Bangladesh? 

The meeting between US President Biden and Chief Adviser Yunus on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, along with recent high-level US diplomatic visits to Dhaka, signals a strategic pivot in US engagement with Bangladesh. 

However, deeming this as a 'reinvigoration' of bilateral relations might be premature. Prof Yunus, an influential global figure, has managed to secure engagements with international leaders — something the previous administration struggled to achieve despite significant lobbying efforts. 

This shift points to a more proactive US diplomatic posture but also reflects Yunus's global stature.

The true measure of success lies in the tangible outcomes of these diplomatic engagements. The US and other states have expressed full support for the interim government and its reform initiatives — marking a diplomatic achievement. Yet, concrete economic or security commitments are still lacking, aside from the $3.5 billion World Bank pledge.

In sum, while these high-level engagements suggest 'renewed' diplomatic ties, a genuine 'reinvigoration' of US-Bangladesh relations will depend on tangible gains in Bangladesh's economic and security landscape in the coming years.

While there are surface-level similarities between the current interim government and the 1/11 caretaker government, it is crucial to recognise that their origins are fundamentally different. The current administration emerged from a grassroots, generational movement — a  revolutionary call for systemic change led by a younger generation of Bangladeshis disillusioned with the existing political order. In contrast, the 1/11 government was a top-down intervention in response to a state of emergency, heavily influenced by military oversight. The present government is instead an expression of popular will, marking a departure from traditional power structures.

Will it sustain and continue through the next government(s) or is it a special treat to Dr Yunus?

While personal connections, such as Dr Yunus's acceptance in the West, can facilitate diplomatic engagement, state-to-state relations are not dependent on individual leaders alone. 

If both Bangladesh and the US perceive their bilateral relationship as strategically beneficial, it is likely to endure and deepen. However, a well-recognised leader like Dr Yunus can certainly accelerate this process.

The previous regime focused heavily on India, engaging with major powers primarily through New Delhi. As a result, other states saw little incentive to engage directly with Dhaka. 

For sustained engagement, this or any future government must position Bangladesh as an independent actor, driven by its national interests rather than regional dependencies. 

Ultimately, states pursue their own security and strategic interests; if Bangladesh can effectively do so, it will create a platform for mutually beneficial cooperation, irrespective of who holds power.

How does it impact India's policy of extending unwavering support to Sheikh Hasina?

Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's stay in India raises questions, as the terms of her presence there remain unclear, and the Indian government has not publicly disclosed its stance. India's policy of unwavering support for Hasina is influenced by its perception of her as a leader who served its strategic interests in Dhaka.

While the US, as a global superpower, can potentially exert diplomatic pressure, it is uncertain how much it can influence India's decision to shelter a leader who showed the highest level of sensitivity to India's interests. 

Similarly, how shifts in US power dynamics might impact India's policy decisions remains unclear.

Much has been said in the media about Narendra Modi not meeting Dr Yunus on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Do you think it was an intentional slight or just a question of logistics?

India's unwavering backing for the previous regime over the past 16 years to its bitter end suggests Delhi preferred that regime above everything else. Indian politicians and diplomats have openly favoured the Awami League, but this stance seems increasingly misaligned with Bangladesh's national interests. 

The loss of power of the Awami League is a setback for India, which appears to be struggling to recalibrate its approach. The absence of a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Dr Yunus indicates a potential diplomatic downgrading.

Given Bangladesh's strategic significance in India's regional calculus, attributing the lack of a meeting to mere logistical issues seems inconceivable. Nevertheless, India's long-term strategic interests will eventually compel it to engage constructively with whichever government holds power in Dhaka.

Do you think this new found warmth between Bangladesh and the US will upset China in the long run?

A stable and prosperous Bangladesh that safeguards its sovereignty aligns with China's interests, as consistently reflected in statements from Chinese leadership during various bilateral engagements. US-Bangladesh relations, aimed at enhancing Bangladesh's democratic institutions and economic growth, are unlikely to directly conflict with China's objectives.

While the US and China are engaged in a broader geopolitical competition, this rivalry does not necessarily manifest uniformly in every country. Despite their strategic competition, the US and China remain key trading partners for each other and they cooperate on a wide range of global issues. 

As long as Bangladesh avoids becoming a strategic pawn for either power, both the US and China could find mutual benefit in supporting a secure, democratic Bangladesh capable of pursuing its national interests.

Do you think the renewed interest in Bangladesh will change if President Donald Trump is re-elected?

Under normal circumstances, a change in US administration rarely results in a drastic shift in foreign policy, as US grand strategy is anchored in long-term national interests. A strong US-Bangladesh partnership aligns with American geopolitical objectives, suggesting that a change in leadership should not significantly impact bilateral ties. 

However, President Trump's first term was marked by a more transactional and unpredictable foreign policy. If re-elected, this could reintroduce volatility into US-Bangladesh relations, as it could for any other US bilateral engagements.

Nevertheless, the institutional checks and balances in the US political system would likely constrain any radical policy shifts. Nonetheless, it is also crucial for Bangladesh to frame its relationship with the US as state-to-state, independent of individual administrations. 

To navigate potential uncertainties, Bangladeshi diplomacy, currently lacking in merit and robustness, must become more strategic and proactive in demonstrating how a strong US-Bangladesh relationship aligns with US strategic interests. Given the competitive nature of Washington's power centres and influence dynamics, Bangladesh must invest in building its diplomatic capital to secure its position.

The current interim government, although not entirely similar in nature, bears some resemblance with the 1/11 caretaker government. That government overstayed their welcome and eventually became somewhat unpopular. How long should a government like this stay in power? 

While there are surface-level similarities between the current interim government and the 1/11 caretaker government, it is crucial to recognise that their origins are fundamentally different. 

The current administration emerged from a grassroots, generational movement — a  revolutionary call for systemic change led by a younger generation of Bangladeshis disillusioned with the existing political order. 

In contrast, the 1/11 government was a top-down intervention in response to a state of emergency, heavily influenced by military oversight. The present government is instead an expression of popular will, marking a departure from traditional power structures.

The mandate of this interim government is to rectify governance failures, restore democratic rights, and protect national sovereignty. The mass uprising was fueled by a desire for a Bangladesh built on meritocracy, equity, and self-determination — explicitly rejecting the family-based rule, kleptocracy, and subservience of the past. 

After 16 years of authoritarian rule, this government faces the monumental task of implementing structural reforms across public institutions, the civil service, and state apparatus to dismantle patron-client networks, and patronage politics and ensure accountability.

The duration of this interim government should be determined by the scope and scale of its reform agenda. A quick fix could risk the resurgence of the same entrenched interests and political elites, risking a relapse into previous forms of misrule. Therefore, a phased, strategic approach to institutional reforms, guided by the revolutionary principles that initiated this movement, is essential to cement long-lasting change.

The success of this government hinges on its composition and its commitment to governance reform. Are its members or advisors the true vanguards of this revolutionary cause, dedicated to governance rooted in public service and reform? If so, they are poised to drive the necessary radical institutional changes. If not, they risk being placeholders, reluctant to challenge the status quo. 

For the US and other international actors, the focus will be on the government's capacity to implement governance reforms that uphold democratic norms and public accountability. Failure to do so may undermine its legitimacy and complicate international support, including from Washington.

Dr Yunus has been vocal about the Rohingya issue. Do you think the US can do more than provide additional financial support?

As a global superpower, the United States has the capacity to take more decisive action on the Rohingya crisis beyond financial aid. While such support is crucial for sustaining their temporary stay in refugee camps, it does not address the root problem. The real solution, as I have emphasised in my writings, lies in the repatriation of the Rohingyas to their homeland — a goal they have consistently expressed.

Dr Yunus, with his international standing, should leverage his platform to engage key actors, particularly the US, urging Washington to adopt a more strategic role beyond financial assistance. 

This involves applying diplomatic pressure on Myanmar, utilising multilateral forums to build a concerted global response, and, critically, enhancing capacity-building for the Bangladesh military to establish a credible deterrence against the Tatmadaw. Financial aid alone will not create the conditions necessary for a sustainable return.