Is India losing its dominance in South Asia?

Illustration: TBS

For some time now, India has remained among the world's superpowers. On the world stage, commonly referred to as the world's largest democracy, India is a powerhouse and a key player in global institutions like G20, BRICS, Quad and what have you.  

In Asia, it competes with China in terms of economic might and influence. In 2022, India overtook China as the country with the largest population in the world – a position China held for the last three centuries. According to the World Bank, the 1.44 billion-strong country's economy is growing at 7%—a feat that eludes China and its neighbours as they struggle to return to pre-pandemic growth levels.

There is a "paradox," however.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 2014 "Neighbourhood First" policy to consolidate India's role as the regional heavyweight might not be showing desired results. One telling sign is that India's neighbouring countries have increasingly sought alternative alliances, particularly China. 

This brings us to New Delhi's debate about whether India is "losing" South Asia. Against the backdrop of the recent fall of the Awami League regime in  Bangladesh, widely and historically considered pro-India, we take stock of India's regional influence shaped by its diplomatic setbacks.  

Of pro-China pivots and Indian bailouts 

The 2023 presidential election in the Maldives was widely seen as a contest between India and China, with the two leading candidates representing opposing affiliations. The then-president, Mohamed Solih, was viewed as pro-India. Solih lost to his challenger, Mohamed Muizzu, who championed a more pro-China stance with his "India Out" campaign.

Muizzu's government immediately called for the removal of Indian troops stationed in the country. The situation worsened after derogatory comments made by Maldivian ministers about Prime Minister Modi, which were later retracted. 

Earlier this year, this issue made global headlines. 

"Seen from the zero-sum lens that often drives great power competition, Beijing is a big winner from this election. Muizzu's campaign plank was not only about strengthening ties with Beijing; it was also about aiming to undermine India by calling for an end to any Indian military presence in Maldives," Michael Kugelman, South Asia director at the Wilson Center, a Washington-based think-tank, told Al Jazeera. 

"This is music to the ears of Beijing," he added.

While India still maintains strong ties with the Maldives, this episode elucidates the vulnerability of its regional position. Smaller nations like the Maldives are increasingly balancing their relationships with both India and China and creating a more competitive geopolitical environment in South Asia.

Earlier this month, President Muizzu arrived in New Delhi for a state dinner—it was a photo opportunity at the Taj Mahal with his wife, "and over $750 million in Indian aid, in the form of currency swaps, to bail his government out of extreme fiscal stress," according to an NYT report. 

India's economic bailout is seen as an initiative to "grease the diplomatic wheels." And the same can be said for Sri Lanka.

The issue of Katchatheevu, a tiny island in the Palk Strait, has long been a point of contention between India and Sri Lanka. While the island was ceded to Sri Lanka in the 1970s, it remains a source of tension, particularly during Indian election campaigns when politicians in Tamil Nadu call for its return.

The ongoing disputes over fishing rights in the waters around Katchatheevu and the detention of Indian fishermen have kept the issue alive. However, Sri Lanka's government has firmly rejected any reopening of talks on the matter, insisting that the issue was resolved decades ago.

India's relationship with Sri Lanka is further complicated by China's growing presence in the island nation. Under Chinese funding, Sri Lanka has developed major infrastructure projects such as the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City, both of which have caused concern in Delhi. While India has pressured Sri Lanka to limit China's influence, Beijing's economic power in Sri Lanka seems to be taking root.  

In 2022, India "seized" a diplomatic opportunity. When the island nation faced an economic collapse, "China was seen as conspicuously absent, and it was hesitant about renegotiating the terms of Sri Lanka's debt. India seized the opportunity, stepping in with $4 billion in various forms of support," reads the NYT report. 

From these two cases, it is evident that India is perhaps compelled to make these foreign policy decisions and come to the aid of its neighbours to smooth over tensions and bad diplomatic relationships. But how long can India keep spending money to outbid China's regional influence is another thing to see. 

A 'complex' relationship

Once considered a close ally, Nepal's relationship with India deteriorated after a series of political and economic missteps. In 2015, Nepal adopted a new constitution, which sparked unrest among the Madhesi community. India, sharing ethnic ties with the Madhesis, supported their cause and imposed a blockade on Nepal's trade routes, plunging the landlocked country into a severe economic crisis.

Although the blockade eventually ended, the damage to India-Nepal relations was significant. 

This also steered Nepal towards China for support, signing trade and infrastructure deals that further alienated India. 

While there have been efforts to restore the relationship, including Modi's visits to Nepal in 2018, the situation remains tense. The boundary dispute over the Kalapani, Lipu Lekh, and Limpiyadhura regions, which escalated after India issued a political map in 2019 claiming the disputed areas, continues to strain ties between the two countries.

Nepal's growing relationship with China accentuates the increasing willingness of South Asian countries to look beyond India for strategic partnerships. This shift in alliances perhaps reflects a broader regional trend — one in which India's neighbours are no longer as dependent on its support.

Bangladesh, a shifting regional landscape and India 

While diplomatic relations between India and Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka seem relatively calm (Maldives' removal of the Indian troops was a tense point of contention earlier this year), Bangladesh's July uprising has upended India-Bangladesh relations of the past 15 years. 

Felani Khatun, a 10-year-old girl, killed by the Indian Border Security Force in 2011 predates Modi's 2014 ineffective "Neighbour First" policy and reflects the deadly vulnerability of Bangladeshis at the border. One can argue that the impunity enjoyed by the BSF was sanctioned by Bangladesh's pro-India foreign policy.

Then there's the Teesta Water Treaty. The longstanding water dispute over the allocation of the shared Teesta River between the two countries goes back many decades. In 1983, a temporary agreement was signed with an expiry date in 1985. Again, in 2011, the proposal for sharing Teesta was drawn up but political barriers – mainly from India's West Bengal – stalls it. 

The Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government shares a long history with India. Prior to the 2024 elections, Hasina seemed defiant even against the pressures from the United States calling for "fair elections," because she had the full support of her neighbour India. 

The politics of the subcontinent and, by extension, South Asia, remain complex. One of the root causes of that "complexity" is the India-Pakistan relationship—the fact that they are constantly at each other's throats has not bode well for the entire region. 

"The notion that Delhi is losing South Asia is rooted in India's collective nostalgia for the legacy of the British Raj, which integrated the Subcontinent into a powerful geopolitical entity, established regional hegemony, and turned the neighbouring territories into protectorates and buffers. That world is long gone, along with the British departure from the Subcontinent."

CR Mohan, The Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

The discontinuation of SAARC (a union of states in South Asia including India and Pakistan) and India's willingness to lean towards BIMSTEC (a union of states that includes Southeast Asia and excludes Pakistan) is one example of the fragile diplomacy between the South Asian nations. There's also Kashmir—a violent point of contention. 

Put all this together, India does seem to be losing its regional "edge" or dominance. 

However, CR Mohan argued, "If India is 'losing' South Asia is not the question" in December 2023 Indian Express. The Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore wrote, "The notion that Delhi is losing South Asia is rooted in India's collective nostalgia for the legacy of the British Raj, which integrated the Subcontinent into a powerful geopolitical entity, established regional hegemony, and turned the neighbouring territories into protectorates and buffers. 

That world is long gone, along with the British departure from the Subcontinent." 

Apart from China's influence in the region, there are Middle Eastern players as well, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, according to Mohan. Meanwhile, the Taliban and Pakistan conflict is "sharpening" and tensions are rising in Myanmar. 

Mohan further argued that moving forward, India needs to discard the notion of the old South Asia and find ways "to gain ground in a changing region. India has enough capabilities to not only preserve its interests but also expand its influence in its neighbourhood." 

"The dichotomy between India's global rise and regional decline has profound implications for India's global aspirations. It is a legitimate question to ask whether a country that is unable to maintain primacy in its periphery will be able to be a pivotal power in international politics," wrote Jawaharlal Nehru University professor Happymon Jacob in The Hindu in May 2024. 

Against a changing regional landscape, India's economic growth and willingness to spend on economic bailouts, a reality seems to persist: India's regional influence is waning.